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WHO SIGNS THE CHECKS? GROFF V. UNITED STATES
DUSTIN APPEL*
AT T DOES the federal government owe to firefighter pi-
lts who die in the line of duty, and does who signs their
paychecks change the answer? In Groff v. United States, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed both issues.' The
Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act ("PSOBA") provides benefits
to public safety officers, including a payment of $250,000 to the
relatives of those who die from injuries sustained in the line of
duty.2 Congress established the program in recognition of the
physical risks that such officers regularly undertake and the
value that the government places upon their service.' The Bu-
reau ofJustice Assistance ("BJA"), within the Department of Jus-
tice, administers the benefits program.4 In Groff the court
upheld the BJA's determination that private contract firefighter
pilots are not "public safety officer[s]" and, thus, are not enti-
tled to the death benefit.5
Lawrence Groff and Craig LaBare were pilots for private con-
tractors who provided firefighting services to the California De-
partment of Forestry and Fire Protection ("CDF") and the U.S.
Forest Service ("USFS"), respectively.6 Although the CDF and
USFS exclusively controlled and directed their flight activities,
the pilots' service contracts explicitly stated that they were pri-
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2009; B.A., The University of Texas at Austin, 1997. The author would like to
thank his beloved wife, Natasha, who makes all of this possible, his parents,
Harlan and LeEtta, and brother Cody, for their constant love and support, and
finally, Ryan Kellus Turner and Ross Fischer, for invaluable advice and counsel.
I See generally Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
2 42 U.S.C.A. § 3796(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
3 Groff v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 68, 76, 88 (Fed. Cl. 2006) (holding that
Groff was a "public safety officer" within the meaning of PSOBA), rev'd, 493 F.3d
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
4 42 U.S.C.A. § 3796(a); Croff 72 Fed. Cl. at 69.
5 Croff 493 F.3d at 1346.
6 Id. at 1346-47.
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vate employees and that each employer was required to main-
tain its own liability insurance.7 Groff died in a mid-air collision
while flying a CDF helicopter to combat a wildfire, whereas
LaBare lost his life when his air tanker crashed during a flight to
deploy fire retardant onto a forest fire.' In letters to the BJA in
support of GroWs claim for the death benefit, the CDF identi-
fied him as an "officially recognized and designated member of
the [CDF]."9 The BJA ultimately denied claims brought on be-
half of both men, holding that neither satisfied the statutory def-
inition of a "public safety officer." 10
When the families appealed these decisions in separate ac-
tions, the Court of Federal Claims reversed and awarded the
benefit to Groff but, acting through a different judge, affirmed
the BJA denial of the death benefit to LaBare." The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit took both cases on consolidated
appeal and resolved the split in favor of the government.12
The critical issue before the court was "whether the BJA acted
lawfully when it determined" that privately employed pilots who
perform fire-fighting duties for public agencies are not "'public
safety officers' within the meaning of the PSOBA."13 First, the
court held that the BJA's interpretation was entitled to the stan-
dard of deference articulated by the Supreme Court in Chevron
U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.14 Applying
the Chevron standard, the court found that the BJA's determina-
tion was proper.1 5
Chevron deference, under which the court will defer to a rea-
sonable administrative interpretation, is appropriate where Con-
gress intended "to delegate to the agency the authority to make
determinations carrying the force of law."16 In this case, the
court first quoted the language of Mead that a "very good indica-
7 Id.
8 Groff, 72 Fed. Cl. at 69.
9 Id. at 83-84.
10 Groff, 493 F.3d at 1346-48.
11 Id. at 1346-47.
12 Id. at 1345-46.
13 Id. at 1349.
14 Id. at 1350. The Chevron doctrine recognizes that in order to administer
congressionally created programs, an administrative agency must have the power
to formulate policy and make rules to fill in legislative gaps. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1974).
15 Groff 493 F.3d at 1353.
16 Id. at 1349-50 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27
(2001)).
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tor" of intent to delegate such authority lies in "express congres-
sional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or
adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which def-
erence is claimed." 7 Here, Congress explicitly authorized the
BJA to "determine[ ], under regulations issued pursuant to [the
PSOBA]," whether a public safety officer died as "the direct and
proximate result" of injuries suffered in the course of duty."8
The court of appeals began with an explicit adoption of its ear-
lier, implicit conclusions in Amber-Messick v. United States and
Chacon v. United States that "grant of that authority . . . re-
flect[ed] Congress's expectation that the BJA would 'be able to
speak with the force of law when it address [ed] ambiguity in the
[PSOBA],"' and, thus, that Chevron deference attached to the
BJA's interpretations of PSOBA terms. 9
The court then employed another of its own post-Mead prece-
dents, in which a Department of Commerce interpretation of
ambiguous statutory terms was at issue, to reinforce this hold-
ing.2" In Pesquera, the court's grant of Chevron deference hinged
on the relative formality of the agency's administrative proceed-
ings, the availability of judicial review, and the fact that the
agency regarded past administrative decisions as precedent. 21
In the case of PSOBA claims, claimants had a right to three
levels of administrative review inside the BJA, culminating in a
proceeding before the director, with written findings of fact and
legal conclusions required at each level.22 BJA determinations
were subject to review by the Court of Federal Claims, and lastly,
the BJA considered "at least some" of its decisions as prece-
dents.23 Based on these factors, the court held that the BJA's
consideration of PSOBA claims met the test required to qualify
for Chevron deference mandated by the Supreme Court under
Mead, and comported with the Court of Appeals' own standards
articulated in Pesquera, Amber-Messick, and Chacon.24
17 Id. at 1350 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 229).
18 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 3796(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)).
19 Id. (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (citing Amber-Messick v. United States,
483 F.3d 1316, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Chacon v. United States, 48 F.3d 508, 512
(Fed. Cir. 1995))).
20 Id. at 1350-51 (citing Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda. v. United States, 266
F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
21 Id. at 1351.
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The court then conducted the two-prong test outlined by
Chevron: first, whether Congress had spoken to the precise ques-
tion at issue, and second, in the event of silence or ambiguity, if
the agency's construction of the statute was permissible.25 Here,
the "precise issue" was "whether the [statutory] term 'public
safety officer' .. . include[d] privately employed pilots ... who
render[ed] fire suppression assistance" for public agencies.26
Because the PSOBA defined "public safety officer" only as "an
individual serving a public agency in an official capacity, with or
without compensation.... as a firefighter," the court found that
the statute was silent on the subject of contract pilots. 2 This
silence required an assessment of the BJA's construction of the
statute for permissibility under the second prong of Chevron.28
The court held it reasonable for the BJA to conclude that the
legislature intended to exclude privately employed individuals. 29
As its only authority, the court pointed to a quotation in the
legislative history from the PSOBA's sponsor that the statute
would not apply to "privately employed safety and security of-
ficers," even when those officers "were called by a local arm of
the government ... to assist in any way," as sufficient indication
of congressional intent to sustain this construction as permissi-
ble under Chevron.30
Further addressing the reasonableness of the interpretation,
the court rejected the assertion that the BJA determination was
contrary to the agency's own precedent that a public service of-
ficer serving "in an official capacity" is one who is "officially rec-
ognized or designated as functionally within or a part of' a
public agency." The court was not swayed by the argument that
LaBare and Groff required approval by their public agencies
prior to service and were obligated to comply with the same
guidelines in their duties as government-employed pilots, nor by
25 Id. Under Chevron, an interpretation need only be reasonable to be permis-
sible, even if there is more than one possible reasonable interpretation. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1974). See
also Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelationship
Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIz. ST. L.J. 921, 940-41, 941
nn.125-26 & nn.128-29 (2006).
26 Groff 493 F.3d at 1353.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1352.
30 Id. at 1353-54.
31 Id. at 1354 (quoting Chacon v. United States, 48 F.3d 508, 512 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
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the fact that the CDF issued an opinion after Groffs death that
stated he was an officially recognized member of the agency.1
2
Similarly, there was no mention in the court's analysis of the
public agencies' exclusive control and direction of the pilots'
flights and operations or the nature of their work in conjunction
with government-employed pilots.3 3 Rather, the analysis turned
upon the fact that Groff and LaBare were hired, paid, and sub-
ject to termination by their employers.34 To support the BJA's
determination that the pilots were not "officially recognized or
designated as functionally," within their respective agencies,
35
the court highlighted provisions of their aviation service con-
tracts, such as the requirement that the pilots' employers main-
tain liability insurance 6.3  And, in Groffs case, the contract
stipulated that the pilot was not an officer, employee, or agent
of the State of CaliforniaY.3  The court held it reasonable for the
BJA to conclude that these provisions outweighed any posthu-
mous statements of recognition and designation by the USFS
and CDF.38
Critics of the Chevron doctrine as it exists today, who claim it
gives administrative agencies unbridled power and deprives the
court of its authority to interpret the law,39 would likely cite Groff
as a textbook case for use of the doctrine to uphold an agency's
interpretation that is patently unreasonable given the substance
of the relationship between contract firefighting pilots and the
public agencies that employed them. It is telling that the court
expended the bulk of its analysis and citation to its own prece-
dent to invoke the Chevron doctrine, but in its brief discussion of
the reasonableness of the BJA's construction under Chevron, ne-
glected the implications of those self-same precedents. Instead,
the court focused exclusively on the most formalistic elements
of the pilots' service. A closer look reveals that the court's prior
decisions in fact cut sharply against the holding that the BJA's
interpretation in Groff was reasonable, as does an examination
of the practical reality of firefighting aviation.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1355.
35 Id. at 1354.
36 Id. at 1355.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 See generally Garry, supra note 25 (discussing the Chevron doctrine and its
application, in general, and diffusing particular criticisms of the Chevron
doctrine).
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The court itself recognized that the value of its sole citation to
the legislative history of the PSOBA as intent to exclude contrac-
tor firefighters from the term "public safety officer" was ques-
tionable.4" Even taken at face value, the quote clearly concerns
personnel who have only a tenuous or ad hoc relationship to a
public agency. The court's prior holdings that the term "public
safety officer" does not include a state-prison inmate volunteer
in a firefighting brigade in Chacon4' or an apprentice firefighter
whose duties consisted mainly of incidental support and
cleanup, such as rolling up hoses and putting away tools, in Am-
ber-Messick,42 strongly support this conclusion. By contrast, Groff
and LaBare performed the core work of these public agencies in
functions indistinguishable from government-employed pilots.
A much better indication of congressional intent in this case
is a recent amendment to the PSOBA in the Patriot Act that
allowed claims for rescue workers slain in the September 11,
2001 attacks without regard to whether they were public or pri-
vate employees.43 The amendment is in fact part of a sustained
pattern of Congress broadening coverage under the statute.44
This expansion of who qualifies as a "public safety officer" is per-
haps a response to the changing reality of government service45
that the court also overlooked in its analysis of reasonableness
under Chevron.
In the case of firefighting aviation, private contractors now
provide the vast bulk of pilots, aircraft, and ground crews for
many public agencies.46 For example, the aviation program of
the CDF currently employs only eighteen public employees to
40 Groff 493 F.3d at 1354 ("remarks of a single legislator, even the sponsor, are
not controlling in analyzing legislative history" (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979))).
41 Chacon v. United States, 48 F.3d 508, 512-13 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
42 Amber-Messick v. United States, 483 F.3d 1316, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
43 Groffv. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 68, 82 (Fed. Cl. 2006), rev'd, 493 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
44 Id. at 79. In fact, legislative history of another recent amendment reveals
that its purpose was to reverse restrictive administrative interpretation by theJus-
tice Department. Id. at 79-80 (citing 149 CONG. REc. 4650-51 (2003) (statement
of Sen. Leahy)).
45 Stephen Barr, Senate Measure Stokes Feud Over Outsourcing Work to Private Sec-
tor, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2007, at D04 (noting "a long-standing Bush administra-
tion effort to put large numbers of federal jobs up for competition with the
private sector").
46 Steve Geissinger, Santa Rosa Firefighter's Widow Persists, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Oct. 1, 2007.
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oversee a staff of 130 contract employees.4 7 Similarly, the USFS
reports that the "majority of the aircraft crews, aircraft and
maintenance support is provided by commercial operators
through contracts and rental agreements," while only a "small
portion" of their fire suppression crew and fleet comes from
other federal, state, or military units." The reason, according to
a USFS spokesperson, is that it simply is not cost-efficient to
maintain government crews year-round, and contractors provide
a cheaper alternative. However, while contracts come and go,
the same pilots typically remain with their particular public
agency for many years, often amassing twenty to thirty years of
service, leading some agencies to view the private employer as
nothing more than a conduit for payment.5" It is also revealing
that California has stepped in to fill the gap in coverage 51 by
enacting remedial legislation to ensure that contract pilots re-
ceive death benefits equal to those of its government-employed
pilots. 52 Thus, in light of the substance of the relationship be-
tween the public agencies and their contract pilots, the BJA in-
terpretation-which has the effect of extending coverage to
only a fraction of those actually risking their lives to combat
fires-hardly seems reasonable, and does not give effect to the
original purpose of the statute: to recognize those who serve and
the physical hazards they endure.
Despite the decision of the court of appeals, GroWs wife has
vowed to continue her long, expensive legal battle with a peti-
tion for review in the Supreme Court, even though it is unlikely
47 California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection Home Page, http://
www.fire.ca.gov (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
48 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., RocKY MOUNTAIN REGION, AVIATION OP-
ERATIONS PLAN 4 (2006), available at http://gacc.nifc.gov/rmcc/docs/aviation-
operations-plan_2006.pdf.
49 Geissinger, supra note 46. Money is also apparently at the heart of resistance
by the USFS to extend PSOBA coverage to its contract pilots, which it claims
could cost as much as $23,000,000. Id.
50 See Groffv. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 68, 84 (Fed. CI. 2006), rev'd, 493 F.3d
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (including language excerpted from CDF letters to the BJA
in support of claim).
51 Geissinger, supra note 46. Many of the contract employers' life insurance
benefits are or were substantially less than the PSOBA benefit. Id. For example,
Groff's family received only $50,000, with no ongoing benefits, following his
death. Id.
52 See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4114.5(a)(1) (West Supp. 2008). The state statute
shifts the responsibility to the private employer to provide a payment equal to
that of the PSOBA sum in the event the pilot's survivors are not entitled to the
federal benefit. Id.
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to change the outcome.5 1 In light of other current, high-profile
examinations of government contractors,54 however, this case
should nonetheless provoke further discussion of the new role
private contractual relationships now play in traditional govern-
ment functions.
Ultimately, the question of what was due to these firefighter
pilots did indeed turn on the narrow issue of whose name ap-
peared on their paychecks, rather than on the substance of the
work they performed-a result that should provide fodder for
critics of Chevron. In Groff the court used Chevron's limitation of
judicial discretion as a shield tojustify an unreasonable adminis-
trative interpretation with cramped, formalistic reasoning and
to avoid a meaningful analysis of the statutory term that would
encompass the substance and practical realities of the public ser-
vice of these brave firefighters.
53 Geissinger, supra note 46.
54 Joe Sterling, Waxman: Contractor's Re-hiring Raises 'Serious Questions', CNN,
Oct. 5, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2O07/POLITICS/10/05/waxman.black
water/ (chronicling the story of a former Blackwater employee accused of mur-
der who was re-hired by a second U.S. contractor overseas).
